Finding the worst-case value of a preference over a set of plausible models is a well-established approach to address the issue of model uncertainty or ambiguity.
Introduction
Expected utility theory (EUT) has been well studied in both the static and dynamic settings, ranging from investment problems to corporate finance. However, behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with EUT have been observed. For instance, EUT fails to explain many paradoxes and puzzles such as the Allais paradox, the Ellesberg paradox,the Friedman and Savage puzzle, and the equity premium puzzle. Considerable attempts and efforts have been made to overcome the drawbacks of EUT; for example, Yaari's dual theory of choice (DT; Yaari (1987) ), Quiggin's rank-dependent utility theory (RDUT; Quiggin (1982) ; Schmeidler (1989) ), and Lopes' SP/A theory (Lopes (1987) ). Among many others, Kahneman and Tversky's cumulated prospect theory (CPT; Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ; Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ) is arguably the most prominent alternative to EUT. Probability weighting (or distortion) -the assumption that individuals overweight unlikely and extreme events, as a key ingredient of the theory, is proposed to capture a different dimension of risk preference over the tail events. It can in turn explain many phenomena; e.g. how hope and fear, properly defined through probability weighting, are present simultaneously for the same individual (see He and Zhou (2016) ).
In decision theory, a decision maker's preference, denoted by a binary relationship ≺, is often modeled by a preference functional U. That is, for any two random outcomes X and Y ,
where X ≺ Y means that the decision maker prefers Y at least as much as X. A decision maker whose preference satisfies (1.1) will be referred to as a U-decision maker in this paper.
Typically, the evaluation of U(X), such as in EUT, DT, RDUT or CPT, requires that the underlying probability measure (or the distribution of X) to be specified. In practice, though, it is more likely that a decision maker is unable to know the exact probability measure governing the random outcome of a decision (as in the Ellsberg paradox). In such cases the decision maker may be concerned about the utility of her decisions under the "worst-case". This leads to the theory of ambiguity/uncertainty aversion (or robust theory) of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (2001) . In mathematical terms, this means
where Q is a collection of possible probability measures, and U Q is the utility of X evaluated under Q ∈ Q.
In this paper we address a particular type of uncertainty: the uncertainty in the dependence structure among random variables. This setting, termed dependence uncertainty by Bernard et al. (2014) , is relevant in many practical cases in which a precise knowledge or modeling for dependence among many random variables is unavailable or simply impossible. Under this setting, the preference of the decision maker is dictated by the worst-case (or best-case) aggregate value of her preference functional. The mathematical formulation is the following: given several distributions F 1 , . . . , F n , one needs to evaluate inf or sup of U n i=1 X i subject to X i ∼ F i , i = 1, . . . , n.
(1.2)
As a concrete example, an investor (a U-decision maker), on top of her financial investment outcome X, has an additional income Y whose distribution F is known but its dependence with the financial market is unspecified 1 . In this case, the worst-case value of her utility for a financial investment outcome X is
which is a special case of (1.2). More examples of (1.2) in decision analysis will be given in Section 5.
The values of (1.2) can be very difficult to evaluate, especially in the case when U is neither concave or convex. In this paper we focus on the case in which U in (1.2) is Yaari's dual utility (see (2.1) below for definition). When U is a quantile (i.e. VaR), problem (1.2) has recently led to an active stream of research in the risk management literature; see e.g. Embrechts et al. (2013 Embrechts et al. ( , 2015 and McNeil et al. (2015, Section 8.4 ).
The paper by Embrechts et al. (2014) contains a survey on risk aggregation with dependence uncertainty in the context of regulatory capital calculation. Unfortunately, 1 Such a Y is termed intractable claim in Hou and Xu (2016) .
the mathematical results from risk management cannot be applied directly to general dual utilities. A major difficulty associated with dual utilities is that commonly used dual utilities are neither convex nor concave functionals, whereas in risk management typically one considers either convex functionals (called convex risk measures in finance)
or quantile functionals (which have nice properties, even if not convex or concave).
In this paper, we focus on the calculation of (1.2) and its economic implications.
Our main contribution is threefold. First we introduce a notion of conditional joint mixability, a generalization of joint mixability by Wang et al. (2013) , which itself is of mathematical interest. Second, we establish bounds on the worst-and best-case values of dual utilities and show that, under an assumption of conditional joint mixability, the above bounds are indeed the exact values of (1.2). For strict inverse-S-shaped distortion functions, conditional joint mixability is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the attainability of the above bounds. These mathematical results will serve as a building block for future research on behavioral investment problems and decision analysis under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we discuss a particular application of our main results, which we call a pessimism effect. We shall see that, with the aversion to dependence uncertainty, a decision maker makes decisions according to an auxiliary risk-averse dual utility that is more pessimistic than her original utility functional, but with the dependence uncertainty removed. This shows that the uncertainty aversion can be "transferred" and built into the dual utility itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we gather some preliminaries on dual utilities. In Section 3 we introduce conditional joint mixability and present some of its basic properties. In Section 4 bounds on dual utilities are established, and their sharpness is shown under conditional joint mixability; moreover we discuss particular results in the case of inverse-S-shaped distortion functions and in the case n = 2.
Through two concrete examples, in Section 5 we illustrate the pessimism effect derived from our main results. Finally we conclude in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Dual utilities
We first fix some notation. Let L 0 be the set of all random variables in an atomless probability space (Ω, F, P). In the following, for any X ∈ L 0 , we use F X for the cdf of X. For any distribution (cdf) F , its generalized inverse (or quantile) F −1 is given by
Let U X be a uniform random variable such that X = F −1 X (U X ) almost surely; such U X is called a uniform transform of X and always exists. Let X be the set of essentially bounded random variables in this probability space, D the set of distributions of essentially bounded random variables, and D 0 the set of all distributions on R. For F ∈ D 0 , write B F = {Y ∈ L 0 : Y ∼ F }. Throughout this paper n represents a fixed positive integer.
Denote by H the set of non-decreasing functions h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with h(0) = h(0 + ) = 0 and h(1 − ) = h(1) = 1. In this paper, a dual utility U h : X → R with h ∈ H is defined as 2
The function h is called a probability perception function, a weighting function or a distortion function in the economic literature.
If at least one of h and F −1 X is continuous, then through an integration by parts and a change of variable, U h can be written as 3
Recall that two random variables X and Y are comonotonic if there exists Ω 0 ⊆ Ω with P(Ω 0 ) = 1 such that
2 Due to the work of Yaari (1987) , the functional U h is also often referred to as a Yaari's dual utility (functional). 3 In the risk management literature, a distortion risk measure is defined, by convention, as ρg(X) = 1 0 McNeil et al. (2015) . It is easy to see that the two definitions reconcile if g is taken as the so-called dual of h, namely,
One of the key properties of dual utilities is comonotonic additivity; that is, a dual utility is always additive for comonotonic random variables. It is also well known that the following four statements are equivalent: (i) h is convex; (ii) U h is concave; (iii) U h is superadditive 4 ; (iv) U h is monotone with respect to the second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). See Lemma 2.1 below for the above assertions.
The main objective of this paper is to study the infimum and the supremum of
. . , Y n with given respective distributions F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ D 0 ; that is, to find the values of
Problems (2.3) and (2.4) represent the worst-case and the best-case dual utility of an aggregate risk under dependence uncertainty, respectively. We emphasize that in this paper we do not assume the probability distortion function h to be concave or convex.
For instance, h may be inverse-S-shaped (see Section 4.2 below for a precise definition), a prominent feature in behavioral economics and finance (e.g. in CPT and RDUT).
Properties of dual utilities
For h ∈ H and t ∈ [0, 1], define its concave and convex hulls h * and h * respectively by h in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) .
Below we collect a few lemmas on properties of dual utilities which will be useful later in the paper. Lemma 2.1 concerns comonotonic additivity, concavity and superadditivity of dual utilities; Lemma 2.2 gives a simple relationship between U h , U h * and 4 A functional U on X is said to be superadditive (resp. subadditive Lemma 2.1 (Theorems 1-2 of Yaari (1987) and Theorem 4.1 of Acerbi (2002) ). For h ∈ H, U h is comonotonic additive. Moreover, the following four statements are equivalent:
(i) h is convex; (ii) U h is concave; (iii) U h is superadditive; (iv) U h is monotone with respect to the second-order stochastic dominance (SSD).
Lemma 2.2 (Lemma 3.1 of Wang et al. (2015) ). For any h ∈ H, we have (i) h * ∈ H and U h * is the smallest subadditive dual utility dominating U h ;
(ii) h * ∈ H and U h * is the largest superadditive dual utility dominated by U h .
Lemma 2.3 (Lemma 5.1 of Brighi and Chipot (1994) ). Suppose that h ∈ H is continuous, then the set {t ∈ [0, 1] : h(t) = h * (t)} (resp. {t ∈ [0, 1] : h(t) = h * (t)}) is the union of some disjoint open intervals, and h * (resp. h * ) is linear on each of the above intervals.
Before ending this section, we present some well known results in the cases that h is convex or concave. In particular, the case that h is convex corresponds to strong risk aversion in decision theory (Lemma 2.1 (iv)). The following proposition is straightforward from the above lemmas.
Proposition 2.4. Let X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ X be random variables with respective distributions
Furthermore, these bounds are attained if X 1 , . . . , X n are comonotonic.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, we have the " " sign in (2.5). Since U h is comonotonic additive (Lemma 2.1), we have " " sign in (2.5). Equation (2.6) is similar.
For the upper bound in the case of a convex h and the lower bound in the case of a concave h, explicit results are available for n = 2, and these bounds are attained by counter-monotonic random variables. Two random variables X 1 and X 2 are said to be counter-monotonic if X 1 and −X 2 are comonotonic.
Proposition 2.5. Let X 1 and X 2 be counter-monotonic random variables with respective distributions F 1 and F 2 , and U ∼ U(0, 1). If h ∈ H is convex, then
If h ∈ H is concave, then
Proof. From Lemma 2.1, U h is SSD-monotone if h is convex, and among all dependence structures, counter-monotonicity maximizes the sum of two random variables in this order (see e.g. Corollary 3.28 of Rüschendorf (2013)).
Bounds of the type Proposition 2.5 cannot be generalized to n 3 since the concept of counter-monotonicity cannot be trivially extended to n 3; see Puccetti and Wang (2015) for extremal dependence concepts. As mentioned above, result in the case that h is neither convex or concave is very limited in the literature except for the case that U h is a quantile (see Embrechts et al. (2015) ). The next few sections are dedicated to the study of this problem for general h ∈ H and n ∈ N.
Conditional joint mixability
In this section, we first recall the definition of joint mixability in Wang et al. (2013) , and then introduce a concept most relevant to the study of dual utilities under dependence uncertainty.
Definition 3.
1. An n-tuple (F 1 , . . . , F n ) of probability distributions on R is jointly mixable if there exist n random variables
is almost surely a constant.
The determination of whether a given tuple of distributions is jointly mixable is a highly non-trivial task. Some analytically characterized classes of distributions that are jointly mixable are given in Wang (2011, 2016) . In the trivial case of n = 2, the joint mixability of (F, G) is equivalent to that F and G are symmetric to each other 5 .
Joint mixability has shown to be instrumental in calculating worst-case values for quantile (VaR) aggregation under dependence uncertainty; see e.g. Embrechts et al. (2013) . For general dual utility functionals, we generalize this idea to a concept of conditional joint mixability. Here and henceforth, for any distribution F and 0 a < b 1, we denote by
Definition 3.2 (Conditional joint mixability). Let I be a set of open subintervals of (0, 1). The n-tuple of distributions (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is I-jointly mixable if (F I 1 , . . . , F I n ) is jointly mixable for each interval I ∈ I.
By convention any n-tuple of distributions is ∅-jointly mixable (here and hereafter ∅ denotes the empty set). Obviously, {(0, 1)}-joint mixability is equivalent to joint mixability defined in Definition 3.1. 5 The distributions F and G are symmetric to each other if there exists c ∈ R such that F (c + x) = 1 − G(c − x) for almost everywhere x ∈ R.
It is not hard to see that conditional joint mixability shares many common properties as joint mixability, such as those in Proposition 2.3 of Wang and Wang (2016) .
However, since a general analytical determination of joint mixability is still unavailable, so is conditional joint mixability. Below we collect some elementary results on conditional joint mixability.
Proposition 3.1. Let I be a set of disjoint open subintervals of (0, 1).
Proof. We only show the case of F ∈ D 0 since the case of F ∈ D is implied from the construction of G below. As I is a set of disjoint open intervals, it is at most countable.
Let G be the distribution of T (U ) where U ∼ U(0, 1). Note that for k ∈ K, T is increasing on I k and for u ∈ I k ,
Therefore, T is an increasing function on [0, 1], and thus T = G −1 almost everywhere on (0, 1). One can easily check that for
Joint mixability and conditional joint mixability can be explicitly characterized for uniform distributions.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that for i = 1, . . . , n, F i is a uniform distribution on an interval of length a i > 0. The following statements are equivalent.
(ii) (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is jointly mixable.
(iii) (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is I-jointly mixable for all sets I of open subintervals of (0, 1).
(iv) (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is I-jointly mixable for some non-empty set I of open subintervals of (0, 1).
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 of Wang and Wang (2016) , an n-tuple of uniform distributions with lengths b 1 , . . . , b n > 0 is jointly mixable if and only if
. . , n}. Note that for each I ∈ I with length |I|, (F I 1 , . . . , F I n ) is an n-tuple of uniform distributions with lengths a 1 |I|, . . . , a n |I|. From there, the implications
Dual utilities with dependence uncertainty
In this section we partially solve the problems (2.3) and (2.4) with the help of conditional joint mixability. We first present some general results, followed by a special case when the distortion functions are inverse-S-shaped.
General results
Recall that the set X consists of essentially bounded random variables; so U h (X)
is properly defined for all h ∈ H and X ∈ X . We first show that if h ∈ H is continuous, then the infimum in (2.3) can always be attained and thus it is a minimum. Similar for the supremum in (2.4).
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that h ∈ H is continuous and F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ D. Then there exist
We use two facts about the set S. First, U h is continuous on S with respect to weak convergence, due to Theorem 2.4 of Embrechts et al. (2015) . Second, for any sequence T 1 , T 2 , · · · ∈ S, there exists a subsequence T k 1 , T k 2 , . . . and T ∈ S such that T k j → T weakly as j → ∞; see Theorem 2.1 (vii) of Bernard et al. (2014) and its proof. Combining the above two facts establishes the desired result.
Note that the attainability in Lemma 4.1 is generally not true for a non-continuous distortion function h, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.1 (Non-attainability). For p ∈ (0, 1), let h(t) = I {t 1−p} , t ∈ [0, 1]. By definition in (2.1), the functional U h : X → R is the right-p-quantile, namely,
Let F be a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Then by Lemma 4.5 of Bernard et al. (2014) and Proposition 8.31 of McNeil et al. (2015) ,
Now we verify that for any
surely, and as a consequence,
This implies P(X 1 + X 2 > 2p) = P(X 1 > p) = 1 − p, and hence P(X 1 + X 2 2p) = p.
Finally,
Thus, the minimum in (4.1) is not attainable.
For any continuous, non-concave distortion function h ∈ H, from Lemma 2.3, there exist (countably many) disjoint open intervals on which h = h * . For h ∈ H, write Theorem 4.2. Suppose that h ∈ H and X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ X with respective distributions
Proof. We only show (i) and (ii), as (iii) is symmetric to (ii).
(i) From Lemma 2.2, we have
By taking infimum and supremum in the above inequality over random variables with distributions respective distributions F 1 , . . . , F n , we obtain (4.2).
(ii) Since h is continuous, we directly work with (2.2). Write I h = {I k , k ∈ K} where
It is harmless to assume the existence of U , as we have only imposed some requirement on the distributions
and
It is easy to check that Y * i ∈ B F i , i = 1, . . . , n, and due to the comonotonic additivity of U h * in Lemma 2.1,
Denote by R n = Y * 1 + · · · + Y * n and write
(4.7)
Clearly R n = G(U ). Noting that G is an increasing function on (0, 1), we have
Rn (t) for almost every t ∈ (0, 1). Write g(t) = 1 − h(1 − t) and g 1 (t) = 1 − h * (1 − t), t ∈ [0, 1]. From the fact that g 1 is linear on each I k , k ∈ K, and
It follows that
Integration by parts yields
where the last equality follows since F −1
Therefore, 
Condition (4.11) is straightforward to check and will be used in Section 5 later.
Remark 4.3. Throughout this paper we work with the set X of essentially bounded random variables so that all dual utilities U h , U h * and U h * are properly defined on the same domain X . If one likes to study U h defined on a set Y larger than X , then it has to be assumed that both U h * (Y ) and U h * (Y ) are finite for all Y ∈ Y. In that case, the results in Theorem 4.2 are still valid based on the same proof.
Remark 4.4. The asymptotics as n → ∞ of the worst-case aggregate values of dual utilities (under the term distortion risk measures) has been studied in Wang et al. (2015) and Cai et al. (2018) under different settings. In particular, Cai et al. (2018) showed that the ratio
is 1 asymptotically as n → ∞, under some regularity conditions on the distributions F 1 , F 2 , . . . and the distortion function h. In other words, for large n, the bounds in Theorem 4.2 provide reasonable approximations for the values of (2.3) and (2.4), even when the assumption of conditional joint mixability is violated.
Example 4.2 (Uniform risks). Suppose that h ∈ H is continuous and for i = 1, . . . , n,
, a i > 0, and n i=1 a i 2 max{a i : i = 1, . . . , n}. The I h -joint mixability of (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is given by Proposition 3.2. For a U h -decision maker, the worst-case utility for an aggregation with marginal distributions
Inverse-S-shaped distortion functions
An inverse-S-shaped function is arguably the most prominent example of probability distortion function in a dual utility used in behavioral economics and finance (such as in CPT or RDUT); see Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998) . 
It is immediate that p h t h q h , h is concave on [0, q h ] and h is convex on [p h , 1].
Note that t h is in general not unique, unless we assume h is strict. On the other hand, p h and q h are unique for a given inverse-S-shaped h.
For inverse-S-shaped h ∈ H, we have I h = {(1 − p h , 1)} and J h = {(0, 1 − q h )}. In the following, if p h = 0 (resp. q h = 1), we interpret {(1−p h , 1)} = ∅ (resp. {(0, 1−q h )} = ∅). Using Theorem 4.2, for F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ D, and X i ∈ B F i , i = 1, . . . , n,
( 4.12) and max
Moreover, the inequalities in (4.12) and (4.13) and hold as equalities under conditional joint mixability specified in Theorem 4.2. In the following theorem, we establish a stronger claim: for a strict inverse-S-shaped distortion function h, the above bounds are attainable only if conditional joint mixability holds. This result suggests that conditional joint mixability is essential to the problem of dual utilities with dependence uncertainty, and under some conditions it gives the only possible dependence structure that attains the bounds.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that h ∈ H is inverse-S-shaped and strict, F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ D, and X i ∈ B F i , i = 1, . . . , n. The inequality in (4.12) holds as an equality if and only if (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is {(1 − p h , 1)}-jointly mixable, and the inequality in (4.13) holds as an equality if and only if (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is {(0, 1 − q h )}-jointly mixable.
Proof. Theorem 4.2 gives the "if" statements. We only show the first "only-if" statement: the inequality in (4.12) is an equality only if (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is {(1 − p h , 1)}-jointly mixable. The second "only-if" statement is analogous.
There is nothing to show if p h = 0, and below we assume p h > 0. Denote by I the interval (1 − p h , 1). Suppose that there exist Y i ∈ B F i , i = 1, . . . , n such that they attain the minimum
and hence U h (T ) = U h * (T ). By definition of U h in (2.1), we have
As h h * , we have h(P(T > x)) = h * (P(T > x)) a.e. x ∈ R. Further, by Proposition 4.3, h(t) > h * (t) for t ∈ (0, p h ). Therefore, P(T > x) does not take values in (0, p h ). As a consequence, there exists M ∈ R such that P(T M ) = 1 and P(T = M ) p h .
For i = 1, . . . , n, let A i ∈ F be an event of probability p h on which Y i takes its largest possible values (that is,
, and let A ∈ F be an event of probability p h on which T takes its largest possible
Note that since P(T = M ) p h , we have
Assume for the moment that M = M . We have, Let the function G be given by, as in (4.7),
and R = G(U ), where U ∼ U(0, 1). By (4.10), U h * (R) = U h * (T ). Let cx and mps denote convex order and mean-preserving spread order in Definitions 1.5.1 and 1.5.25
of Müller and Stoyan (2002) , respectively. Write S = n i=1 F −1 i (U ). As comonotonicity maximizes convex order of the sum, we have T cx S, which implies
for all x ∈ R. By Theorem 1.5.7 of Müller and Stoyan (2002) , together with the fact that
By Theorem 1.5.27 of Müller and Stoyan (2002) , there exists a sequence {T 1 , T 2 , . . . } with T k mps T k+1 for all k, such that T = T 1 and T k → R in distribution. Since U h * is SSD-monotone (Lemma 2.1), and mps is stronger than cx (which implies the oppose direction of SSD), we have
By definition of mps , there exists
F T k+1 (x) for x > x 0 . Inverting the distribution functions, there exists
(t) for t < t 0 and F
, t ∈ (0, 1). Then Φ(t) 0 for t ∈ (0, t 0 ) and Φ(t) 0 for t ∈ (t 0 , 1).
Since T k and T k+1 have the same mean because T k mps T k+1 , we have
, and hence, 17) where h * is the left-derivative of h * . Let ξ = inf t∈(0,t 0 ) h * (1 − t). Putting (4.16) and (4.17) together, we have (4.18) Note that the left-hand side of (4.18) is non-negative since h * (1 − t) ξ and Φ(t) 0 for t ∈ (0, t 0 ), and the right-hand side of (4.18) is non-positive since h * (1 − t) ξ and Φ(t) 0 for t ∈ (t 0 , 1). Therefore, we have
As h (and h * ) is strictly convex on (0, p h ), we know that h * (t) > h * (s) a.e. for t ∈ (p h , 1) and s ∈ (0, p h ). There are two possibilities:
(a) t 0 1 − p h . In this case, h * (1 − t) < ξ for t ∈ (1 − p h , 1), and (4.19) implies Φ(t) = 0 and (4.19) implies Φ(t) = 0 for t ∈ (0, 1 − p h ).
In both cases, by (4.16), we have
bounded above by M , the Bounded Convergence Theorem gives, as k → ∞,
That is, M = M and the proof is complete.
As a special case of Theorem 4.4, if h is strictly convex, then
if and only if (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is jointly mixable. This fact can be verified directly. Intuitively, for a risk-averse decision maker, the best-possible risk given its mean is a constant.
Remark 4.5. As we can see from the proof of Theorem 4.4, the strictness assumption of h is used to assure h * (t) > h * (s) a.e. for t ∈ (p h , 1) and s ∈ (0, p h ). Hence, this assumption can be weakened to that h * is not linear in a neighbourhood of p h . If h * is indeed linear in a neighbourhood (a, b) of p h , using the same proof of Theorem 4.2, we can see that the bound (4.12) is attainable if (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is {(1 − b, 1)}-jointly mixable but not necessarily {(1−p h , 1)}-jointly mixable. Note that {(1−b, 1)}-and {(1−p h , 1)}-joint mixability do not imply each other in general. Hence, such an assumption is not dispensable.
Remark 4.6. Commonly used distortion functions in decision theory are strict. For instance, the famous probability perception functions (distortion functions) introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998) are both strict.
The pessimism effect
In this section we present an application of our main results to decision theory in terms of what we call the pessimism effect. Let us first look at an inverse-S-shaped distortion function as in Figure 2 .1. To compare h and h * , one can see that h puts high weights on both extreme gains and extreme losses, whereas h * puts the same high weight on the losses but much less weight for gains. Chateauneuf et al. (2005) define the index of pessimism for U h as
It is clear from the definition that P h * P h as h * h. Therefore, a U h * -decision maker is more pessimistic (i.e. with a greater index of pessimism) than a U h -decision maker, and for this statement to hold we do not need to restrict ourselves to inverse-S-shaped distortion functions.
From Theorem 4.2, we have seen that the two dual utilities U h and U h * are already very well connected in the presence of dependence uncertainty. Below we make this connection more precise from a decision analysis perspective, via two concrete examples.
We will see that a U h -decision maker with dependence uncertainty may act like the (artificial) concave U h * -decision maker without dependence uncertainty; thus, conceptually, the fear for uncertainty translates into a more pessimistic preference.
Example 5.1. The first example concerns insurance risks with a truncated Pareto distribution. For θ > 1, let the distribution of a random variable X θ be given by
That is, X θ has a truncated Pareto(2) distribution with truncation point θ. Let F θ be the distribution of −X θ . The distribution F θ is often used to model insurance losses with a limit θ in the payment (e.g. in auto insurance). It is straightforward that
Suppose that h ∈ H is inverse-S-shaped with p h = 0.84 (see e.g. Figure 2 .1) 6 , and an insurer A with utility functional U h insures n risks Y 1 , . . . , Y n identically distributed as F θ with uncertain dependence. Insurer A collects a premium p(θ) for each risk she insures, in which p is an increasing function determined by the market. Her problem is to design an insurance policy, i.e. to determine θ over θ ∈ [2.5, ∞) to maximize her utility.
For given θ ∈ [2.5, ∞), the utility for A under dependence uncertainty is
Note that p h θ −2 , and
has an increasing density on its support, the joint mixability of the
) is equivalent to condition (4.11), which in the present case is
The value p h = 0.84 is chosen for the ease of calculation.
or n 3.5. Therefore, for n 4, we know that the n-tuple (F θ , . . . , F θ ) is (1 − p h , 1)-jointly mixable. Now, by Proposition 4.3, we have, for n 4,
Thus, insurer A will make decision over θ ∈ [2.5, ∞) in the same way as she would with the utility U h * (−X θ ) + p(θ), which is independent of n as long as n 4. In other words, due to the fear for dependence uncertainty, the insurer A's decision is dictated by U h * instead of her original utility U h .
Before presenting the next example, we have the following result which is interesting in its own right.
Theorem 5.1. For any continuous h ∈ H and X ∈ X , we have
Proof. We only show (5.1) since (5.2) is symmetric to (5.1). First, from Theorem 4.2 (i),
Combining (5.3)-(5.4) we obtain (5.1).
Remark 5.1. For any X, Y ∈ X , it follows from Theorem 4.2 that
One may wonder for a given X ∈ X , whether there exist Y ∈ X such that one of the above two inequalities holds as an equality. Theorem 5.1 confirms that the answer is positive. Indeed, Theorem 5.1 can be formulated equivalently as follows. For any continuous h ∈ H and X ∈ X , there exist Y ∈ X and Z ∈ X such that
Example 5.2. This example is based on Theorem 5.1, in which we do not need to assume an inverse-S-shaped distortion function h. Suppose that a U h -decision maker B
has an intractable claim Y , for which the only information that she knows is U h * (Y ) k where k is some constant. This may be interpreted as: an imaginary U h * -decision maker C, who is more pessimistic than B, would agree that this risk Y has a utility at least k.
Hence, the utility of Y is also at least k for B, as U h U h * . Now, the decision maker B is concerned about the worst-case utility of her investment X over an admissible set A. By Theorem 5.1, the resulting utility of X ∈ A for her is min Y ∈X , U h * (Y ) k {U h (X + Y )} = U h * (X) + k.
That is, due to the fear for uncertainty in both the distribution of Y and the dependence between X and Y , the investor B becomes pessimistic so that she would make decision on X ∈ A according to the artificial concave utility functional U h * . Note that the imaginary investor, C, would have the same worst-case utility because (h * ) * = h * .
A technical by-product is that, although the original optimization problem max
is not a convex problem, the optimization problem under uncertainty, max X∈A U h * (X), becomes convex. This creates great convenience for further research on optimal investment.
The above two examples suggest that dual utilities are capable of absorbing people's attitude towards uncertainty into the functional forms and, in particular, into the corresponding distortion functions.
We can obtain the same conclusion by symmetry for an optimistic investor. For instance, in the setup of Example 5.2, if a U h -decision maker D is concerned about the best-case utility of X + Y for an investment X ∈ A, U h (X + Y ) subject to Y ∈ X , U h * (Y ) k, then she will end up with max {U h (X + Y ) : Y ∈ X , U h * (Y ) k} = U h * (X) + k.
That is, she is indeed as optimistic as a decision maker whose preference is modeled by the convex utility functional U h * , which only puts high weights on extreme gains.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduce the notion of conditional joint mixability, and establish (under the assumption of conditional joint mixability) the exact best-and worst-case values of dual utility functions for an aggregate risk in which the dependence is uncertain. For strict inverse-S-shaped distortion functions, we show that the above bounds are attainable if and only if the assumption of conditional joint mixability holds. An economic implication of our results is what we call the pessimism effect: in the presence of dependence uncertainty, a decision maker equipped with a dual utility tends to be more pessimistic and she makes decision according to an auxiliary concave dual utility.
We recognize that the exact best and worst values in Theorem 4.2 require a rather strong assumption of conditional joint mixability, which is not easy to check for general distributions. Nevertheless, by imposing this condition we observe interesting consequences such as those presented in Section 5, leading to a new interpretation of dependence uncertainty in decision making. Moreover, the bounds in Theorem 4.2 may be used as approximations if the assumption of conditional joint mixability is dropped (see Remark 4.4).
Moving forward, various decision problems such as optimal consumption or portfolio selection with dual utilities and dependence uncertainty may be studied. Another possible direction of further research is to evaluate risk aggregation under uncertainty for RDUT and CPT functionals. Although mathematical formulas for RDUT and CPT may not be as elegant as in Theorem 4.2 of this paper, they may nonetheless serve well for other broad classes of decision problems and applications.
